This paper explores from a historical perspective the process of financialization over the course of the 20th century. We identify four phases of financialization: the first, from the 1900s to 1933 (early financialization); the second, from 1933 to 1940 (transitory phase); the third, between 1945 and 1973 (definancialization); and the fourth period begins in the early 1970s and leads to the Great Recession (complex financialization). Our findings indicate that the main features of the current phase of financialization were already in place in the first period. We closely examine institutions within these distinct financial regimes and focus on the relative size of the financial sector, the respective regulation regime of each period, and the intensity of the shareholder value orientation, as well as the level of financial innovations implemented. Although financialization is a recent term, the process is far from novel.
INTRODUCTION
When did financialization start? While there is much literature on the increasing dominance of finance in the United States after 1970, little work to date has attempted to investigate whether financialization was taking place earlier. Whereas few authors consider financialization as an evolutionary process that can be traced back to precapitalist societies, most analysts emphasize the neoliberal period beginning in the 1980s.
Financialization, as Sawyer (2013-14) appropriately describes it, is a process that widely varies in form and intensity across time and space. Accordingly, by utilizing empirical and qualitative analytical tools coming from different schools of thought, we identify distinct phases of financialization during the 20th century in the US. In particular, we examine the resemblance of financialization's characteristics in the early 20th century with those of the contemporary period, questioning whether the current phase of financialization is a vaguely different repetition of its older counterpart, as observed, for example, in the early 1900s.
To carry out our task, we divide the sample period into four distinct regimes, marked by structural breaks in the institutional setting of the economy, which affected the functioning of the financial sector. The first period of early financialization lasts from the beginning of the 20th century up until 1933, as the New Deal agreement brought significant changes in financial regulation and policy orientation. The second period (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) reflects the transitory phase of the economy that leads to the third period, the "Golden Age of Capitalist Development" . The crisis of 1973 heralded the end of the Golden Age. Lastly, we apply Dumenil and Levy's (2011) definition of neoliberalism as "financialized capitalism" to link the fourth period of complex financialization with 1974-2010. We contribute to the relevant literature by exploring financialization from a historical perspective and pointing out different varieties of financialization throughout the 20th century in the US. While most studies focus on a few criteria to establish evidence of financialization, we employ a plethora of empirical and qualitative indicators that allow us to formulate a synthetic argument for the pace and the form of financialization in each distinct regime. We argue that financialization, characterized by an increased role of the financial sector along with higher complexity across financial objectives and institutions, is merely the current phase of a historical process that has been unfolding since the dawn of the 20th century. In our view, the early 1930s period presents a significant resemblance to the current phase of financialization.
Financialization is associated with financial booms and busts and has a negative impact on the real production of the economy, as it results in unemployment and highlights income inequalities. History shows that the degree of financialization is a policy variable. For instance, in the postwar period, policymakers implemented a range of policy instruments (such as full employment policies of a Keynesian flavor) and enforced a strong regulatory environment in order to restrict the uncontrolled explosion of finance. The implications of our findings could point towards policies that could reverse the destabilizing effects financialization has on society.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses theoretical contributions with respect to financialization; section 3 looks at the data relating to the financialization process, focusing on the importance of the financial sector; and section 4 provides an analysis of the course of financialization throughout the 20th century, paying close attention to the interaction between financial innovations and the regulatory environment, as well as to the degree of shareholder value orientation in the economy.
We also scrutinize the commitment of fiscal and monetary policies to full employment and low inflation targeting. In the penultimate section we examine whether the economic system is prone to financial collapse and summarize our findings, which formulate and support our argument, while the last section concludes.
VARIETIES OF FINANCIALIZATION
Financialization is a broad concept with multiple dimensions interacting in the economic, social, and institutional domain. The most common definition for financialization is the one provided by Epstein (2005: 1) , who refers to the process as "the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and international level." In a similar vein, Vercelli (2013-14: 5) defines financialization as "the process of evolution which has progressively increased the crucial role of money in the economy and society shaping the forms of exchange, circulation, distribution, and accumulation of exchange value."
Although both definitions are rather broad, they capture the complex nature of financialization and its links to the underlying institutional structures. However, the absence of a single criterion that would integrate every dimension of financialization renders the establishment of relevant evidence a rather challenging task for empirical researchers.
The broadness and the importance of financialization led several authors to an investigation of a rather wide scope regarding the origins of the phenomenon, and triggered a debate on whether financialization dates centuries back or if it constitutes a unique phase of the current phase of capitalism. Following Sawyer (2013-14) , we identify two large strands of literature on financialization. The first examines the evolution and the size of the financial sector and has its origins in both mainstream and heterodox schools of thought. For instance, Vercelli (2013-14) associates financialization with the penetration of different forms of money in society through financial innovations, and identifies a "secular tendency towards financialization" that originates in ancient civilizations, although he recognizes two distinct phases of financialization in the 20th century. Mainstream authors tend to highlight the positive consequences of financialization, often referring to it as "financial development."
They employ several proxies of financialization, such as the size of the economy's banking sector, its loan provision capacity, or measure the relative importance of the financial sector, by going back as far as their data sources allow (see Greenwood and Scharfstein 2013) . By contrast, heterodox authors largely examine the destabilizing impact of financialization on the economic and social domain. The second literature strand, deriving mainly from heterodox schools of thought, tends to associate financialization with the era of neoliberalism, which began in the 1980s for most developed economies, and describes it as a different form of capitalism in which finance has become more dominant than it previously had been and penetrated in various realms of society (Sawyer 2013-14) . Table 1 presents some pertinent studies in each approach that are employed in this paper.
Next we provide an overview of several of the listed approaches to financialization, among them, a strand of research that focuses on the submission of the production process to the principles of financial liquidity. For instance, Palley (2007: 2) suggests that financialization is "a process whereby financial markets, financial institutions, and financial elites gain greater influence over economic policy and economic outcomes." This process is characterized by "a slight shift in income toward capital, a change in the composition of payments to capital that has increased the interest share, and an increase in the financial sector's share of total profits" (Palley 2007: 14) .
Similarly, Orlean (1999) associates financialization with the restructuring of the internal organization of the firm, as a response to the increasingly powerful interests of the stock market.
This approach is close to the view that financialization refers to the increasing power of the rentier class. It derives from earlier works of Hilferding (1910) and Lenin (1916) and has been more recently advocated by Dumenil and Levy (2002) and Epstein and Jayadev (2005) . However, this view could be considered as too narrow, as it focuses solely on the rentier class, while currently the firm has become the "battleground" for different agents, including workers, managers, shareholders, and financiers (Stockhammer 2005-06) . According to advocates of "shareholder value orientation," the growth pattern of the firm has shifted from "retain and invest" to "downsize and distribute" (Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000) . In particular, shareholders are considered to have a short-term orientation with respect to firms' profits, as they are interested in higher dividend payments and higher stock prices, which is in stark contrast to the managers' aim for long-run growth of the firm. Higher dividend payments imply lower retained earnings, while higher stock prices translate to low equity issuance (Hein and van Treeck 2008) . Therefore, financing of investments becomes feasible only through the use of external means, such as higher loans and increased leverage ratios, which render the firms financially fragile.
Close to the shareholder value orientation norm is the definition provided by Arrighi (1994) and Krippner (2005) , according to which financialization is a pattern of accumulation, where profit is accrued primarily due to financial activities and less so due to production or trade activities. Arrighi's and Krippner's definitions coincide with the shareholder value orientation view in the fact that productive firms engage in financial activities, either because the expected profit in the financial market is higher than the corresponding profit in the goods market, or because the conditions associated with high dividend payments are so strict that they essentially force firms to seek additional gains in the financial market. As put by Dallery (2008) , the profit rate has become "an end in itself." Nevertheless, as noted by several authors, 1 the impact of this process has ambiguous results on accumulation, with the institutional setting of the economy defining its ultimate goal and the associated regime (Stockhammer 2004) .
A considerable amount of research has focused on financial innovations as a feature of financialization. Hilferding (1910) looked at financial derivatives as a tool of capturing the essence of speculation, which lies solely in the exchange value (Sotiropoulos 2012) . In addition, Phillips (1996) links the intensity of financial innovation to the volume of trading in the financial markets.
Financial innovation has also been extended to the rise of new consumption patterns, bound to higher household debt structures with distributional implications (Palley 1994; Dutt 2005) . Hein and Mundt (2013) suggest that stagnating wages are linked to increased household debt and result in debt-led consumption booms, while Bhaduri, Laski, and Riese (2006) focus on the wealth effect on consumption, where higher levels of financial wealth induce households to spend more, given financial deregulation. Lastly, Montgomerie (2006) looks at the introduction of credit cards, which allowed more financial institutions to enter the credit market.
Financialization varies in terms of pace and form, and one can identify periods of financialization as well as of definancialization (Sawyer 2013-14) . However, comparing distinct periods of financialization is not an easy task, since "there are too many factors to account for change and capitalism cannot necessarily be characterized by compartmentalized sub-epochs" (Orhangazi 2008: 24) . The comparison becomes even trickier, as different schools of thought in economics consider different indicators, proxies, and definitions to measure financialization. In identifying distinct phases of financialization in the US economy, we apply the following methodological statement: We assume that the capitalist system is a prerequisite for the process of financialization, as well as a certain degree of financial development, in the sense that financial instruments become commonplace.
According to Graeber (2011) , the evolution of debt instruments can be traced back for 5,000 years, however we select the beginning of the 20th century as our starting point, as it satisfies the following methodological statement: a) US capitalism had already been in place for a significant amount of time; and b) it was a period characterized by a fairly developed financial sector that gave birth to modern consumer credit (Calder 1999; Feretti 2008) . Thereafter, we divide the period into four distinct regimes associated with structural breaks in the institutional setting of the economy in order to make comparisons in terms of institutions, polices, and economic outcomes in each period. These structural changes in capitalism did not occur within the period of a calendar year, rather they took place gradually. For this reason, developments during the 1930s and 1970s could only function as proxies of an ongoing change, the effects of which were observed in late 1940s and early 1980s, respectively. Stockhammer (2004), by dividing the share of interest and dividend payments by the share of profits, empirically tested the hypothesis that short-run investment in financial instruments is preferred to long-run investment in real capital. His hypothesis is rejected for Germany and perhaps the UK, but is valid for France and the US. Van Treeck (2008b) employed a Kaleckian growth rate of investment function for the US to find that interest and dividend payments have a significant negative impact on accumulation, while Orhangazi (2008) found that on a micro-firm level, financial profits have a negative impact on large firms but a positive one on small firms, as financial profits relax the financial constraints.
These attempts vary in methodology and in each sample's period, yet they reach similar conclusions. However, none of the above extends its analysis prior to WWII.
In the following subsection, we attempt to shed some light on issues related to financialization throughout the 20th century in the US, with the use of descriptive statistics.
Shareholder Value Orientation
The shareholder value orientation can be viewed as the pressure on managers to ensure short-term profits at the expense of firms' long-run growth. By using this approach, the similarities between the first and the fourth periods of financialization are striking.
The rise of the joint stock company in the first period provided financial institutions with the option to control corporations by placing their representatives on corporations' boards, by holding their stocks, and by the provision of higher loans (Orhangazi 2008: 24) . As an immediate result of this condition, financing capitalists were actually monitoring managers (DeLong 1991) . From a similar point of view, the productive capital was financialized (Pineault 2001 , cited in Orhangazi 2004 , which, in combination with the developments in the stock market, had a detrimental impact on the sustainability of the economic system (Keynes 1936: 160) .
The overall switch in the mentality of entrepreneurs towards the pursuit of prospective, and even speculative, profit as compared to the mentality of the entrepreneurs in the late 19th century was already noted by Keynes (1936: 159) in the interwar period.
The intense regulation and interventionist policies in the second period paid off in the third, where the boom in fixed capital formation signified a transition towards a longrun orientation with respect to firms' growth (Marglin and Schor 1990) . Overall, this period was characterized by financial tranquility, where the pressure on managers, by financiers and stockholders, was reduced (Orhangazi 2008: 30) .
However, in the last period, this pressure once again resurged, in a rather "formal" manner, as compared to the first one. For instance, the imposition of the so-called return-of-equity (ROE) norm was indicative of the ultimate goal of management, which was to maximize the return value to shareholders.
To proxy the level of shareholder value orientation, we focus on the controversy that arises between the dividend payments and the internal financing of investments.
4 Table 2 presents the average shares of net dividend payments and retained earnings over corporate profits after tax. The first period spans from 1929 to 1932; therefore, the related values are a mere reflection of the irregularity of the Great Depression, where corporations were distributing sums that exceeded their profits, presumably to sustain the price of their shares.
However, the blurred depiction of the first period is somewhat restored in view of the second period, where no dramatic changes in the institutional framework of the associated variables were observed. Specifically, distributed profits accounted for more than 80% of the overall profits, implying an overwhelming "originate and distribute" orientation (Sawyer 2013-14) .
This condition is reversed in the third period, with retained earnings accounting for 60% of profits, which comes in line with the investment boom in the Golden Age.
However, in the latest period, the pressure on managers is depicted in the higher share of net dividends, accounting for 55% of profits. In advance, the intensity of the distribution of profits becomes higher in the period close to the Great Recession. For instance, the average shares of net dividend payments and retained earnings in the period between 1995 and 2008 were equal to 64% and 36%, respectively. Subsequently, we examine corporations' external debt, paying much attention to the corporate bond and equity issuance. Corporate bond issuance, depicted in figure 4a, presents high volatility in the first period of financialization, yet it fluctuates at a considerably higher level than equity issuance. This pattern is followed in the second period; in the third, bond issuance stabilizes around 1.5% of GDP, to explode in the latest phase of financialization. Overall, evaluating shareholder value orientation in a consistent manner is not an easy task, given the data limitations and the distinct institutional framework in each period.
However, our analysis suggests that common elements are present between the first and the fourth period under consideration, providing support for the argument in favor of financialization in the early 1900s.
Financial Innovations, Regulatory Framework, and Household Credit

Financial innovations growth rate
Financial innovations stand at the core of financialization, as they allow the financial sector to overcome regulatory barriers and therefore increase its relative economic power (Bhaduri 2011) . Until recently, numerous authors perceived them as a contributor to economic development and prosperity (Bernstein 1996) , as they "increase risk sharing, lower transaction costs, and reduce information and agency costs" (Merton and Perold 1997: 108) . Only a few scholars highlighted the other side of the coin. One of them was Hyman Minsky (1990: 60) , who stressed that "economies with financial innovations that are driven by market prospects are structurally conducive to booms and busts."
The quantitative assessment of the role of financial innovation as contributing factor to the financialization process is a complicated task, as it is not possible to point out which innovation contributed to what extent to the process. the banks that were mostly interested in the bond market rather than commercial activity more than doubled (Peach 1941 contributing factor was also the increased competition for deposits (White 1986 ).
According to Dymski (1991) , during the 1920s, immense competition for deposits increased interest costs, leading banking institutions on a quest for high return, i.e., riskier loans.
The higher leverage structure also served the purchase of stocks, which implies higher stock prices and, therefore, capital gains. Speculation during the 1920s rendered the US economy financially fragile. The intensive securitization, with the use of uninsured deposits as collateral in combination with the stock-market rally, led to the stock-market crash in 1929.
The outbreak of the Great Depression was followed both by interventionist policies and legislative initiatives, which aimed to prevent any further deterioration of the economy and control the potentially destabilizing threats of the financial activity in the productive sector. The most critical policy response with respect to the functioning of the financial sector was the Glass-Steagall Act, passed in 1933.
Specifically, policymakers were particularly concerned with the involvement of banks in the securities market, as they were identified as one of the major causes for the massive bank failures during the Great Depression (Crawford 2011) The intense regulation, in combination with weak foreign competition, resulted in financial tranquility, where the pressure on managers by financiers and stockholders was reduced (Orhangazi 2008: 30) .
In the first two decades after WWII, the US economy achieved an almost full employment state, experiencing only minor recessions and modest inflation periods (Minsky 1986 ), while financial activity was carried out under the control of the Fed with the use of the Fed's discount window and open-market operations (Minsky 1986 ).
However, the institutional changes in the financial sector and, in general, the attempts to regulate its functioning lacked a coherent theoretical framework that would allow for a dynamic and continuous regulating process (Minsky 1986: 43-45 ). This argument is verified by the fact that during the 1960s, a period characterized by strong investment growth, financial innovation in the money market-i.e., by introducing the certificate of deposits, real estate investment trusts (REITs), and the commercial paper-rendered the Fed's controlling instruments ineffective, since the latter were not adapted to the new financial environment.
More importantly, the structure of debt had a critical role in the period at hand. As a follow-up to the Great Depression, government debt started rising and even surpassed private debt during WWII, reaching a record level of 113% of GDP (see figure 7) .
Indeed, it was the first time that public debt penetrated into firms' and households' balance sheets as a financial asset (Minsky 1986:37-38) . 
Household indebtedness
Today, perhaps the most notable example of financial innovations affecting the macroeconomic environment is household credit. For instance, Palley (2007: 24) suggests that:
Borrowing is also supported by steady financial innovation that ensures a flow of new financial products allowing increased leverage and widening the range of assets that can be collateralized. Additionally, credit standards have been lowered in recent years, which has made credit even more easily available to households, firms, and financial investors. Possibly the most notable innovation boosting household credit is the promotion of risk management techniques. Asymmetric information (moral hazard and adverse selection) in the credit market reduces lenders' ability to estimate the capacity of borrowers to service their debts. Indeed, the primary aim of risk management is to handle this risk of default (Langley 2008 ). As such, risk management allows for greater credit expansion with supposedly minimal risk to the resilience of the financial system.
Until the third period under examination, the risks involved in the process of collateralized and consumer borrowing were monitored primarily through relational and "face-to-face practices" (Leyshon and Thrift 1999) . Contemporary techniques in risk management (e.g., credit reporting and scoring) removed the physical proximity hitherto required for managing such uncertainties (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001; Marron 2007) . A typical example of higher sophistication in the credit market is the launch of risk-based pricing, in other words, the tailoring of the loan's price to a borrower's probability of default, with the borrower's probability being estimated upon their past credit records. Lastly, advancements in marketing techniques for advertising financial products increased the customer base of banks and other financial institutions (Bertrand et al. 2010 ).
Indeed, financial liberalization played a large role in unlocking the landscape so that financial innovations could come into play. A direct effect of financial liberalization was the large-scale removal of credit constraints for a big portion of households. The process of removing credit constraints was termed the "democratization of credit" by former Federal Reserve Governor Lawrence Lindsey in 1997, as it reflects the increasingly wider access to credit by middle-and lower-income households. While the extent to which credit constraints are binding varies over time, across countries, and across financial institutions within each country, their presence has a considerable effect on the composition and magnitude of debt holdings on balance sheets of households (Kent, Ossolinski, and Willard 2007) .
Fiscal and Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we examine monetary and fiscal policy with respect to the financialization process. In particular, we assess the role of fiscal policy in promoting full employment and question whether monetary policy has been accommodative to the financial sector.
In the first period under examination, the global monetary system was dictated by the "gold standard," which included movements of gold between central banks, as a response to international non-financial transactions (Eichengreen and Temin 1997) .
The aim of the gold standard was to secure price stability and constrain fiscal expansion, reflecting "the mentality and the type of conduct of […] economic elites" (Eichengreen and Temin 1997) .
This condition had a considerable effect on the money supply and the balance sheet of the central banks. As shown by Godley and Lavoie (2007) , the system favored the exporting countries, since a deficit in the current account of the importing country implied a reduction of gold reserves of the central bank, which ought to be counterbalanced by an increase in the Treasury bills held by the central bank. This effect gave rise to the twin deficit phenomenon in the importing countries. Given that governments did not favor budget deficits, another option for rebalancing the current account was deflating the economy, with the main burden being laid upon wages, as was the case before WWI (Eichengreen and Temin 1997) .
In the US, the lack of a central monetary authority controlled by the government prior to 1913 allows us to safely assume that the interests of the financial sector were de facto accommodated. Financial regulation, carried out by the state governments, could be hardly thought of as effective (Komai and Richardson 2011) . In regards to foreign competition and imposed imbalances by the gold standard framework, the current account deficit at the turn of the century was reversed to a surplus in the run-up to WWI, since UK's major supplier of war machinery was the US (Arrighi 1994) . This tendency was further heightened after WWI when the US experienced massive inflows of capital due to its strong productivity growth as compared to major
European countries, as well as the uncertainty created by the inability of the latter to honor their debt commitments (Arrighi 1994) .
In this context, the specific conditions of that time favored the US financial sector;
however, in terms of monetary policy, the outcome is ambiguous. Although there are considerable elements in favor of an accommodative monetary policy, they arguably do not suffice to reach reliable conclusions. Nevertheless, in regards to fiscal policy, non-commitment to full employment was clearly evident.
The fiscal policy inaugurated under the leadership of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 marked a regime change in terms of policy goals, when a set of acts was implemented to combat recession and unemployment. According to Papadimitriou (2008) , these fiscal interventions were a close approximation to an employer of last resort policy, even though they did not succeed in rendering the demand for labor inelastic. 
ASSESSING THE FINANCIALIZATION PROCESS IN THE US ECONOMY DURING THE 20th CENTURY
In this section, we evaluate the preceding analysis to formulate an argument in favor of or against the existence of financialization in the periods under consideration.
Before taking a final step in our analysis, we examine a last condition for the aggregate economy, related to the leverage structures of banks and corporations. In particular, we follow the notion provided by the two most distinguished authors of the Old Institutionalist School, namely Veblen (1904) and Minsky (1986) , who both highlighted the inner tendency of the macrofinancial system towards financial fragility, due to the imposition of increasing leverage, which renders the economic system prone to financial collapse (Argitis 2013) . 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper explored the process of financialization throughout the last century and provided evidence of its deep roots in the beginning of the 20th century. In order to carry out our analysis, we divided our sample period into four distinct phases: the first period ends with the initiation of New Deal in 1933, the second covers the remainder of the 1930s until the outbreak of WWII, the third is the Golden Age , and the fourth refers to the neoliberal phase of capitalism, following the oil crisis of 1973 and the beginning of financial deregulation in the US.
The resemblance in the conditions between the first and the fourth period is remarkable. In spite of institutional and formal differences, the presence of primary indicators of financialization, as discussed in this paper, satisfy our main hypothesis, which is that the first period under consideration indeed constitutes an early form of financialization. The second period can be viewed as a transitional phase to definancialization, which occurred in the third period under our consideration.
We have shown that the income share of the financial sector rises considerably in the first and the last period, while being significantly lower in the second and third periods.
Pressure on managers to attain short-term profits, contrary to the firms' long-run growth, was evident both at the beginning of the 20th century and in the modern period. This condition has a severe impact on the financial stability of the economic system, since it reduces fixed capital formation or pushes the leverage ratios upwards, inducing financial fragility.
It seems also that financial innovations, which historically constitute a means for the financial system to avoid regulation and thus a significant feature of financialization, do not work in a vacuum. We showed that the rate of growth of financial patents and innovations grew at a steady pace throughout the 20th century. Of utmost importance, however, is whether the implemented regulatory framework allows financial intermediaries to apply new technologies in order to skirt regulation. In line with Minsky (1986) , we strongly argue that the adoption of new technologies in finance ought to be backed by an institutional regulatory framework, and properly addressed by promoting regulation as a dynamic process.
There are also significant discrepancies in terms of economic policy between the four periods under examination. For example, the full employment goal was a key priority for policymakers in the second and the third period. Additionally, the dominance of the productive sector and the strengthening of unions are also key features of the third period of definancialization. In advance, monetary policy conducted under a financialized regime, as is the case in the fourth period, emphasizes in the interests of the financial sector, while neglecting those of the productive sector and the working class. In full contrast, monetary policy in the third period aimed to support fiscal stimulus, and therefore enhanced aggregate demand.
